Thursday 4 November 2010

‘Football hooliganism’


Couple of days ago, I witnessed the aftermath of the football match between Sunderland and Newcastle. It was a chaotic situation, with people yelling and breaking bottles and being aggressive. Police was trying to ease the situation and it finally did. While I was staring, I was wondering which laws prevent such incidents from occurring.  I will share with you some of my findings. First and foremost, a major wagon used is the banning orders.

Section 30 of the Public Order Act 1986 provided powers to control the movement of ‘hooligans’, by serving with ‘exclusion orders’ those convicted of ‘football-related’ offences. Consequently, it became a criminal offence to attend ‘designated football matches’ during the currency of the Order. These orders were seen as a successful weapon in the dismantling of several prominent ‘firms’. The Football Spectators Act 1989 (Part 2, S.15) extended these powers by allowing for the imposition of ‘restriction orders’ following conviction for football-related offences to prevent the defendant from leaving the UK when English teams were playing abroad.[1] Moreover, the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 (which amended the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999) was introduced as the aforementioned Acts were not sufficient to grant a restriction order in the absence of a conviction. The 2000 Act allowed ‘banning orders’ to be granted where the courts were satisfied that the order would help to prevent violence or disorder in connection with regulated matches. A Banning Order can now be granted against persons who are convicted with relevant offences (s.14A) and also can be made ‘on complaint’ of a chief officer of police against a person who had ‘at any time caused or contributed to any violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere’ (s.14B). Persons subject to an order were not allowed to attend domestic football games and they also had to report to a police station at the time the matches were playing abroad. In addition, they had to surrender their passports.[2] The banning orders, especially the 2000 Act, succeeded to reduce dramatically the incidents of hooliganism during the last years.[3]
 
The aforementioned laws are indeed harsh but at the same time effective. There are some concerns regarding proportionality and Human Rights (as fundamental rights are infringed, such as art. 5, 6, 8 and the free movement of persons) but this is a long discussion. Overall, I believe that the banning order might be an effective response to football hooliganism but as it happens with most, if not all, of the legislations BOs carry negative aspects.


Further Reading:

Beloff, M. J. (2006) ‘Editorial’ International Sports Law Review, I.S.L.R. 55

James, M. & Pearson, G. (2006) ‘Football Banning Orders: Analyzing their Use in Court’ Journal of Criminal Law, JoCL 70 (509)

Samuels, A. (2002) ‘Football Hooliganism: Stopping it, and Punishing it’ Justice of the Peace, (2002) 166 JPN 426

Blackshaw, I. (2001) ‘Football hooligans and human rights’ New Law Journal, 151 NLJ 1562

Thomas, D.A. (2008) ‘Sentencing: Football Spectators Act 1989 - banning order made on conviction for offence’ Criminal Law Review, Crim. L.R. 575







[1] Stott, C. & Pearson, G. (2006) ‘Football Banning Orders, Proportionality, and Public Order Policing’ The Howard Journal, Vol 45 No 3
[2] Beloff, M. J. (2006) ‘Editorial’ International Sports Law Review, I.S.L.R. 55 
[3] Stott, C. & Pearson, G. (2006) ‘Football Banning Orders, Proportionality, and Public Order Policing’ The Howard Journal, Vol 45 No 3

Wednesday 3 November 2010


Postal Rule in English Contract Law


Under English contract law, each contract requires an offer and acceptance of that offer. According to the case of Entores v. Miles Far East Corp. [1955] 2 QB 327, the acceptance must be communicated. However, the case of Adams v. Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681 introduced an exception to the general rule which required the acceptance to be communicated in order to be valid. Since the Adams case, if the post is the arranged (or proper) method to communicate acceptance, then the acceptance is deemed complete as soon as the letter of acceptance is posted. It should be noted that for a letter of acceptance to be valid it has to be posted, addressed and stamped properly.[1] The letter is regarded as posted only when it is in the possession of the post office.[2]



The postal rule revealed implications in its function. For instance, it does not apply to instantaneous forms of communications; such as telex, telephone or fax.[3] Moreover, under the postal rule if an offerree has posted his acceptance then he cannot revoke it by other means, such as telephone. Therefore, it is possible for a letter of acceptance to be posted after a letter of revocation of the offer has been posted but before it is delivered, and acceptance will be complete at the time that the letter of acceptance was posted. In such case the offeror's revocation would be out of action. Finally, given that the acceptance is complete once the letter of acceptance is posted, it makes no difference whether the offeror actually receives the letter.[4] If a letter of acceptance were to be lost or delayed in the post, acceptance has still taken place.

 

In my opinion, two issues urgently arising for the above discussion concern the revocation and the time that the acceptance reaches the recipient (if it finally does). As regards to the former, it seems to me excessively restrictive not to be able to revoke the offer before the acceptance has reached the offerror. It is unfair, considering that under the general rule of contract, revocation of an offer can occur any time before the acceptance. Regarding the latter, I believe that having accepted an offer before the acceptance reaches the offerror must be very confusing in many cases.



Further reading:

Poole, J. (2008) Casebook on Contract Law (9th edn) Oxford University Press, Oxford

Turner, C. (2005) Key Facts Contract Law (2nd edn) Hodder Arnold, Abingdon

Mckendrick, E. (2007) Contract Law (7th edn) Palgrave Mcmillan









[1] Re London and Northern Bank (1900) 1 Ch 220; Getreideimport GmbH v Contimar (1953) 2 All ER 223, [1953] 1 WLR 793, [1953] 1 Lloyd's Rep 572.
[2] Re London & Northern Bank [1900] 1 Ch 220
[3] Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327
[4] Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344
What are the key international regulations governing the prohibition of child labour; are they successful?



According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), child labour is putting a child in hazardous conditions in regards to physical, ethical and educational development with exploitation being the main element[1]. Moreover, the definition also includes conditions of slavery, sexual exploitation and child involuntary conscription[2].

Under article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child[3], the member nations recognise the right of the child to be protected from the aforementioned conditions that constitute child labour[4]. Moreover, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms[5] also holds authority in prohibiting child labour under article 32. In international labour law, prohibition of child labour is regulated by the ILO[6]. Under the Convention 138[7] the minimum age for admission to hazardous employment is 18 years of age. 

There are various criticisms surrounding the area, with some of them being discussed below. There are accusations against the UN Convention[8] and ILO instruments[9] regarding their voluntary nature. This criticism originates from the fact that, only the states which agreed to ratify the UN convention are legally bound to comply with it.  Moreover, ILO cannot enforce its instruments as there are not sanctions to be taken for non obliging members[10]. Besides, only member states, employers and employee associations can bring a claim of infringement[11]. Finally, ILO has been deemed responsible for the fact that most member states were given the freedom to interpret the conventions in a vague[12] language; thus enabling them to exercise 'creative' implementation.

To sum up, the system is partly successful as it has managed to lower child labour[13]. However, there is a long way ahead before the child labour can be fully extinguished.  




[1]'About child labour' (International Labour Organization)
 <http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang--en/> accessed 31 October 2010
[2]Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (adopted 17 July 1999, entered into force 19 November 2000) C182 (International Labour Convention)  <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C182> accessed 31 October 2010
[3]Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) UNGA Res 44/25 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm> accessed 31 October 2010
[4] UNGA Res 44/25 (n8)
[5]Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (as amended 364/01) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf> accessed 31 October 2010
[6] 'About the ILO' (International Labour Organization) <http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 31 October 2010
[7]Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (adopted 26 July 1973, entered into force 19 July 1976) C138 (International Labour Convention)  <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C138> accessed 31 October 2010
[8]UNGA Res 44/25 (n8)
[9] (n15)
[10]' The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)' (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) <http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/npt.html> accessed 31 October 2010
[11]Steven Simpson, 'Enforcement of Human Rights through ILO Machinery' [1995] 03-01 Human Rights Brief  <http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v3i1/ilo31.htm> accessed 31 October 2010
[12]Guy Standing, 'The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?' [2008] 39-03 Development and Change <http://www.unhistory.org/pdf/StandingILO.pdf> accessed 31 October 2010
[13]'Facts on Child Labour 2010' [2010] International Labour Organization; Media and Public Information <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_126685.pdf> accessed 31 October 2010
Fairtrade Presentation

The link to my group's presentation on Fairtrade essay 1 can be accessed here.


Celebrity merchandise and the tort of passing off

Tempted by a topic of intellectual property law on the character merchandising, I was taken to write for some of the issues encompassing the area.




Celebrities tend to seek protection of their personality’s business value under, inter alia, the tort of passing-off.[1] According to the tort of passing-off, “nobody has any right to represent his goods as the goods of someone else”.[2] In terms of the “classical trinity”, a passing off action prevents a misrepresentation by the defendant leading to confusion (or deception) and causing damage to the goodwill acquired by the plaintiff in his goods, name, mark, etc. Apart from the above the celebrity has to prove that there is a “common field of activity” between the parties, which indicates the misrepresentation and the confusion that was created to the public. If the celebrity fails to prove such a connection then the case will collapse. [3] 

However, in the recent case of Irvine v Talksport Ltd[4], Laddie J. rejected the common field of activity requirement on the basis that it severely limited the application of the tort of passing off. Instead, the requirement for a successful case is goodwill and misrepresentative endorsement.  Although this case has marked a dramatic change in the law of the United Kingdom, it only applies to endorsement cases and not merchandising cases. Therefore, celebrity merchandising still enjoys very little or no protection at all.

Before we can draw any conclusions, we need to understand the difference between merchandise and endorsement. Endorsement of a product is when someone tells to the public that he approves of the product and is happy to be associated with it. On the other hand, merchandising could be the sale of memorabilia. For example, a porcelain plate bearing the image of the late Diana, Princess of Wales could hardly be thought of as being endorsed by her, but the enhanced sales which may be achieved by virtue of the presence of the image is a form of merchandising.[5] If that is the case should Diana have to prove a common field of activity in order to succeed in a claim against undesirable exposure?

I believe that the development of the law in this area seems to be problematic. In my view, instead of patching up the current laws, the legislators should create new ones which will allow celebrities to protect their name, likeness and voice, by providing them with the right to control and profit from the commercial use of one’s name, image...etc, and prevent unauthorized appropriation of the same for commercial purposes.





Further Reading:

Scanlan, G. (2003) “Personality, Endorsement and everything: The Modern Law of Passing Off and the myth of the Personality Right” European Intellectual Property Review, E.I.P.R. 563.

Bains, S. (2007) ‘Personality rights: should the UK grant celebrities a proprietary right in their personality? Part 1’ Entertainment Law Review, Ent. L.R. 164

Torremans, P. (2008) ‘Intellectual Property Law’ (5th Edn) Oxford: Oxford University Press
MacQueen, H. et al. (2008) ‘Contemporary Intellectual Property’ Oxford: Oxford University Press



[1] Klink, J. (2003) ‘50 years of publicity rights in the United States and the never ending hassle with intellectual property and personality rights in Europe’ Intellectual Property Quarterly, I.P.Q. 363
[2] ibid
[3] Aldo De Landa Barajas. (2009) ‘Personality rights in the United States and the United Kingdom - is Vanna too much? Is Irvine not enough? ‘Entertainment Law Review, Ent. L.R. 253
[4] Irvine v Talksport Ltd (Damages) [2002] EWHC 539; [2003] EWCA Civ 423
[5] Per Laddie J in  Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 414 at 418b

Two types of contract for the carriage of goods by sea


There are two types of contract used in the carriage of goods by sea; the charter party contract and the bill of lading contract

Charter party contract
Charter party is a contract between the ship owner and the charterer with the intention to use the whole vessel, or part of her, for a voyage/s for a period of time. The charter parties are not bound by either the Hague-Visby Rules or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. Therefore, the contract depends mostly on supply and demand factors. The three main categories of charter party are the following: the voyage charter party (the vessel is chartered for a specific voyage), the time charter party (the vessel is chartered for a specific period of time) and the charter party by demise (the vessel is leased to the charterer). 

Bill of lading contract
Bill of lading is a contract for the carriage of goods. It is a document often used as a receipt of the shipment of the goods. It is also used as evidence to the charter party contract. Finally, a bill of lading indicates the particular vessel on which the goods have been placed, their intended destination, and the terms for transporting the shipment to its final destination. It should be noted that the bill of lading, in contradiction to the charter party contract, is bound by the Hague-Visby Rules and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992.



Further Reading:








http://www.maritimeknowhow.com/English/Know-How/Chartering/evidence_in_matters_of_affreightment/bill_of_lading_versus_charter_party.html